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Islam and Secular State in Uzbekistan: 
State Control of Religion and its Implications  
for the Understanding of Secularity 
Henrik OHLSSON 
Since independence, religion, particularly Islam, has taken on an 
altogether new role in the nation-building process in Uzbekistan. The 
government now embraces Islam as a national heritage and a moral gui-
deline. This has meant an upsurge in Islamic activity, but also, after a few 
years of tumult in the early 1990s, a tightening of government control of 
religious education and practice. 
Islamic societies have historically, for the most part, lacked central 
canonizing bodies. But with the political developments of the last century, 
along with the emergence of radical revivalist currents in Islam, govern-
ments in Muslim countries have begun to feel a need for a more stringent 
central control of religion. As the title indicates, the aim of my study is to 
examine the official structures that control religion in contemporary 
Uzbekistan, and what this control means for an understanding of 
secularism. My central question can be put as follows: has a new form of 
canonization in Islam begun to take shape within the framework of the 
nation-state? And, more specifically, are the state institutions in Uzbekistan 
to be considered religious, and thus canonizing bodies, or are they part of 
the secular state structure? In this paper, I will present some of the basic 
problems one has to face in attempting to understand secularity in a post-
Soviet society with a predominantly Muslim population, along with a brief 
account of the religious situation in present day Uzbekistan and the official 
structure that controls religion in the country.  
Defining secularity  
First of all one has to define the basic meaning of the word secular. 
Initially, the simplest and widest possible definition will have to suffice; 
the word secular implies some degree of separation between political and 
religious authority. The definition of religion and state, and the exact deli-
mitation of the two spheres are of course complicated questions which 
I will have to leave aside in this paper. Secondly, I want to distinguish 
between 1) secularity, that is, the quality, in a society, of being secular, 2) 
secularization, that is, the social process that makes a society increasingly 
secular, and 3) secularism, that is, the ideas that inspire the process of 
secularization.  
The concept of secularity, as well as most of the theoretical treat-
ment of the subject, is built on historical developments in predominantly 
Christian societies, and to simply assume that the same theories and 
486 Henrik OHLSSON 
models are automatically applicable to a society with a Muslim majority 
may be misleading. One of the problems is that Christianity usually takes 
the shape of tangible organizations, either as a central body, comprising 
(or with the ambition to comprise) society as a whole, or as denomi-
nations with a clearly specified membership. Islam has, for most of its 
history, lacked a central canonizing body and the different currents of 
thought which have emerged in Islam have rarely taken the shape of 
tangible organizations or denominations. Of course, the Sufi orders could 
be seen as tangible organizations or denominations, but only as long as 
the analysis is limited to those individuals involved in an active master-
pupil relationship with a Sufi teacher. The much looser affiliation of a 
whole local society to a certain Sufi order, which has been a common 
scenario not least in Central Asia, does not comfortably fit into the same 
pattern. In most Islamic societies, religious authority has traditionally 
been localized, centred on charismatic individuals such as scholars of 
Islamic law, mullahs or Sufi masters.  
One of the prominent scholars of the field, David Martin, has based 
his general theory of secularization solely on the historical experience of 
Christian Europe and the United States. The secularization process he 
describes and interprets has its roots in the European Enlightenment, but 
has developed quite differently in different countries depending on the 
religious situation. In Catholic countries, where the church has histori-
cally had something of a religious monopoly, the forces of secularization 
tend to find themselves in a direct confrontation with the church and to 
develop a strong antireligious sentiment. Religion as such becomes a 
matter of dispute. In Protestant countries some degree of pluralism of 
religion has often developed in parallel with the forces of secularization. 
The denominations in a Protestant society may be associated with dif-
ferent social classes and form alliances with different political forces. In 
this way the confrontation does not become as strong and religion as such 
never becomes a matter of serious dispute. The Russian historical expe-
rience is, in Martin’s understanding, quite similar to that of most Catholic 
countries: a religious monopoly is confronted violently by revolutionary 
forces with a strong antireligious sentiment (Martin 1978, pp. 17-23). 
The different ways in which the process of secularization has pro-
ceeded in different societies have produced a variety of forms in which 
secularity may appear, as well as different interpretations of the concept 
of secularism in the policies of different governments. Ahmet T. Kuru has 
discussed this matter using the terms passive and assertive secularism. The 
two categories are described as follows: 
Passive secularism implies state neutrality toward various religions and 
allows the public visibility of religion. Assertive secularism, on the other 
hand, means that the state favours a secular worldview in the public sphere 
and aims to confine religion to the private sphere (2006, p. 137). 
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The prime example of passive secularism in his article is the United 
States, while Turkey exemplifies the assertive type. Another example of 
assertive secularism is the French laïcité. This ideological and legal cons-
truct fits right into Martin’s historical model where a religious monopoly 
has been confronted by an antireligious secularizing force. The French 
scholar Olivier Roy (2007) characterizes French laïcité as assimilationist, 
as opposed to the multiculturalism that prevails in most Protestant coun-
tries. This means that religion, race and ethnicity are expected to be left at 
home, in the private sphere, while in the public sphere the visibility of 
religion is minimized. The recent ban on headscarves and other religious 
symbols in public schools is an example of this ambition. The secularism 
that, since the 1920s, has been state ideology in Turkey (where the ban on 
headscarves in universities was recently abolished) is similar to the French 
laïcité in that it asserts the confinement of religion to the private sphere. 
An important difference from the French model, however, is the state 
control of religion in Turkey, where a state department regulates religious 
education and imams are state employees. In fact, in most Muslim coun-
tries today there is a degree of state control of religious education. In post-
Soviet Central Asia this is most definitely the case. This may be one of 
the most important differences between Christian and Muslim countries in 
general. Actually, as a rough generalization, one could say that the 
Christian world, ever since Reformation, has been moving from a situa-
tion of religious monopoly toward greater diversification, while the 
Islamic world, at least in the last century or so, has been moving in the 
opposite direction. Of course there are other factors, both external and 
internal, that have led to a greater diversification in Muslim countries as 
well, such as the emergence of new religions, the secularization of edu-
cated classes, etc. Still, I think this general tendency toward a greater 
degree of state control of religion in many Muslim countries is worth 
keeping in mind.  
This brings us back to the question whether secularity, as it is gene-
rally understood, is a Christian phenomenon. In the contemporary debate 
the opinion is sometimes voiced that Islam is in essence all-encompassing 
and thus incompatible with the idea of a partition between state and reli-
gion. In Christianity, on the other hand, it is stated already in the Gospel 
of Matthew: “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; 
and unto God the things that are God’s” (Matt. 22:21). In this passage 
some have found a theologically based predestination in Christianity 
leading naturally to a secular form of society. The connection between 
theology and politics, however, is just not that simple. Olivier Roy, who 
discusses this problem in his book Secularism Confronts Islam, calls this 
move from the theological level to the political a methodological error 
and states that:  
When the church finally accepted the secular republic, this was not becau-
se a commission of theologians had spent years rereading the Gospels but 
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because the Vatican drew the political lessons from the inescapable advent 
of the republic and adapted to it (commissions serve only to provide phi-
losophical arguments to justify decisions already made for political rea-
sons) (2007, p. 39). 
The question whether the differences that can be observed between 
Christian and Muslim countries, as regards the relation between state and 
religion, are due to theological differences between the religions or to 
differences in political developments unrelated to, or at least not determi-
ned by, religion, is thus no simple matter. For one thing, much of the 
Islamic world has been subject to European colonialism. Obviously this 
has had a great impact on both the political and religious developments in 
these countries, not least on the way oppositional religious movements 
have been formed.  
Post-Soviet Central Asia shares some experiences with other coloni-
zed Muslim countries, but, having been part of the Soviet Union for 
seven decades, the region also has some peculiarities that separates it 
from the rest of the Islamic world. The pre-Soviet situation in Central 
Asia had some traits in common with the typical protestant society as 
described by David Martin. First of all, as has been the normal situation 
in Muslim societies across the world, there was no religious monopoly. 
Secondly, the forces of reform – most prominently the jadids – expressed 
their vision in religious terms, as did, of course, the conservative ulama 
who opposed them. Religion as such was not a matter of dispute, but a 
certain degree of secularization nevertheless took place as the jadids 
introduced more worldly subjects into the educational system.  
After the Russian revolution of 1917, however, the victorious side –
the strongly antireligious Bolsheviks – exported, or superimposed, their 
version of secularism on Central Asia, creating – in many ways – a uni-
que situation in the history of secularization. Soviet secularism was most 
definitely of the assertive category, even more so than the French or 
Turkish. The so-called “scientific atheism”, which was part of the Soviet 
state ideology, was not satisfied with just confining religion to the private 
sphere or putting it under state control. The ultimate aim was the comple-
te eradication of religion from the minds of people, as religion created, in 
Marxist-Leninist terminology, a “false consciousness” which constituted 
an obstacle to socialist progress. Perhaps this should not even be defined 
as secularism, since the aim is not the separation of state and religion, but 
the eradication of one of them.  
Naturally, even the Soviet state had to make compromises with reali-
ty and even though some serious attempts at abolishing religion altoge-
ther were made, especially in the first two decades after the revolution, it 
ultimately had to succumb to forming centralized organs to control it.  
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Religious revival in Uzbekistan  
After independence, the Uzbek government has shown an ambition 
to resurrect and reconstruct their country’s Islamic traditions, but, consti-
tutionally, Uzbekistan remains a secular state. The Uzbek constitution 
from 1992 provides that religious assemblies should be separated from 
the state and that the state should not meddle in their affairs.1 At the same 
time the country has an elaborate official religious structure. The Spiritual 
Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan (the SADUM of Soviet times) 
remains, but has been reformed and renamed the Muslim Board of Uzbe-
kistan (MBU, in Uzbek: O’zbekiston Musulmonlari Idorasi).  
It is clear that the developments in the post-independence period 
have forced all the former Soviet republics in Central Asia to rethink their 
religious policies to some degree. However, different countries have dealt 
with the emergence of Islamic extremism and the influx of ideas from the 
Middle East and Pakistan in somewhat different ways. In Tajikistan a civil 
war broke out in the 1990s, in which the Islamic Renaissance Party of 
Tajikistan (IRPT) played an important part. In the peace treaty that ended 
the war a power sharing agreement was included which gave some influ-
ence in the parliament to the IRPT. Thus, political parties based on religion 
are now permitted in Tajikistan, while banned in all the other former Soviet 
Central Asian countries.  
After independence, the former Soviet republics of Central Asia had 
to reinvent themselves as nation states. A process of nationalization had 
indeed already begun in the Soviet era. In order to avoid a situation where 
the issue of nationality would stand in the way of socialism, a strategy 
was formed by the Bolshevik Party under the dictum: “national in form, 
socialist in content”. The national consciousness of the various peoples 
under the Soviet Union was boosted, but in a controlled way so as to 
avoid the emergence of aggressive forms of nationalism. One important 
issue in the Muslim dominated parts of the Soviet Union was probably to 
counter the emergence of pan-Turkism, which posed a threat to the unity 
of the Soviet state. According to the scholar Adeeb Khalid this policy 
was so effective that by the end of the Soviet era the reality was closer to 
a reversed version of the official dictum: “socialist in form, national in 
content” (Khalid 2007, pp. 94-95).  
Thus, the groundwork for the formation of nation-states was made 
already long before independence, but with independence the nationali-
zing process naturally ascended to a new level. New constitutions were 
adopted, the languages of the titular populations were elevated to the 
status of official languages, and the religious issue suddenly took on a 
                                                   
1 § 61, O’zbekiston Respublikasining Konstitutsiasi, “O’zbekiston” nashriyot-matb’aa ijodiy 
uyi 2008.  
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whole new importance. The latter appears to have come as something of 
a surprise to the governments of Central Asia, all of whom had just 
recently been part of the highly secular (or atheist) Soviet political struc-
ture. Left with a political map drawn in the 1920s under Stalin, in an area 
that had been multiethnic for many centuries, the formation of nation 
states was not without its complications. Although Uzbeks constitute the 
majority of the population of Uzbekistan there are several larger and 
smaller minorities, notably Tajiks, Russians and Karakalpaks, the latter of 
which have been granted a semi-autonomous region in the northwest of 
the country. There is also a widespread Uzbek-Tajik bilingualism, espe-
cially in the old cities of Bukhara and Samarkand. At the same time about 
90% of the population in Uzbekistan are Sunni Muslims. Under those 
circumstances Islam became a natural rallying point for a new collective 
identity.  
In the early 1990s scores of foreign Islamic proselytizers flocked to 
Central Asia in an attempt to seize the opportunity to bring these coun-
tries back into the community of Muslim nations, and the Muslim bre-
thren, who had long suffered under an atheist regime, back on the true 
path. The largest groups of proselytizers came from Turkey and Saudi 
Arabia.  
The Turkish missions included Sufis with the aim of rekindling the 
Sufi tariqats2 of Naqshbandiyya and Yasawiyya in the land of their ori-
gin, as well as so called nurçular, a movement with a moderate Islamist 
message led by Fethullah Gülen, once a pupil of Said Nursi, from whom 
the movement has its name. This movement is also inspired by Sufi ideas, 
but presents them in a modernized package, without the traditional pir-
murid “master-pupil” relationship. Structurally it is a network of private 
enterprises ranging from media to trading. They have opened schools and 
commercial enterprises in all the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, 
though they were expelled from Uzbekistan after a few years.  
The Saudi Arabian missionaries propagated their strict Wahhabi in-
terpretation of Islam which would often clash both with local Islamic 
traditions and with governmental policies. The Saudi mission included 
members of the ethnically Uzbek community in Saudi Arabia, which 
originated from two waves of migration from Central Asia in the 1930s 
and 1970s. 
Having realized the importance of Islam in the formation of a new 
collective identity the Central Asian governments at first welcomed these 
foreign proselytizers. Soon, however, they became suspicious of the 
ultimate aims of the proselytizers and concerned about the risk of civil 
unrest caused by radical religious ideas. The Uzbek government took a 
particularly firm grip of the situation, urged partially by the disastrous 
turn of events in neighbouring Tajikistan, but also by certain developments 
on the home front. In 1992, in the town of Namangan in the Ferghana 
                                                   
2 Tariqat : Sufi order. 
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valley, a group of radical Islamist youth took over the local headquarters 
of the former Communist party. They urged president Karimov to come 
to Namangan, which he did, and listen to a number of demands, including 
the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan and the use of shari‛a 
as the only legal system. The militant youth organization Adolat “Justice” 
was formed under the leadership of young underground imam Tahir 
Yuldashev and former Soviet paratrooper Jumboi Hojiev, later to be 
known as Juma Namangani after his home town. Some of their members 
were educated at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia and their ideology 
was clearly inspired by Saudi Wahhabism. The Islamist uprising spread 
all over the Ferghana valley – an area known even in Soviet times to be 
an Islamic stronghold. The leadership openly challenged the government, 
hoping the Karimov regime would soon fall. The regime, however, 
prevailed, and eventually struck down hard on the Islamic militants, many 
of whom saw fit to leave the country and join Islamist struggles in 
Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This marked the beginning of an era of strict 
government control of religious expressions. In 1992 and ‘93 some fifty 
Saudi missionaries were expelled from Uzbekistan. In 1994 the news-
paper of the Turkish nurçular movement, Zaman, was banned. In 
1999 their schools in Uzbekistan were closed down. The Sufi mis-
sionaries too have been forced to end their activities in the country. The 
official sympathy that the government professes for Sufism, as part of a 
national tradition, seems to be limited mostly to the intellectual level. The 
prospect of a re-emergence of actual tariqat is probably not particularly 
appealing to the Uzbek government; as such a structure could turn into a 
competing power base.  
In the last few years the only foreign missionary work carried out in 
the open in Uzbekistan has been that of various evangelical Christian 
groups and so-called “new religions”. Lately the government has grown 
suspicious of those groups too, not so much out of fear that their ideas 
might lead to terrorism as concern that their sometimes quite aggressive 
proselytizing is upsetting to public morality. These groups are not consi-
dered part of the national culture in the same way as other minority reli-
gions such as Judaism and Russian Orthodox Christianity. Proselytizing 
is forbidden according to the “Law on Freedom of Conscience and 
Religious Organizations” adopted in 1998.  
Uzbekistan’s official religious structure  
One of the problems I want to look into is whether the secularism of 
Uzbek governmental policy is to be understood as passive or assertive in 
Kuru’s terms. The constitution appears to promote state neutrality in reli-
gious matters, but since its adoption, other legal tools dealing with reli-
gious extremism, such as amendments to the penal code, have been deve-
loped. In order to get a firm grip of the religious activities in the country 
the government of Uzbekistan has built a thorough and, at least officially, 
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all encompassing structure, partially based on pre-existing structures from 
Soviet times.  
Directly under the Cabinet of Ministers (the government) has been 
formed a Committee for Religious Affairs (CRA), consisting of experts in 
various fields, which oversees all religious activities in the country. Apart 
from Islam there are 16 officially recognized faiths in Uzbekistan and 
more than 2000 registered religious organizations3, all of which have to 
answer to the Committee.  
Islam, being the religion of 90% of the population, naturally has a 
privileged position. All mosques and Islamic education must be affiliated 
to the Muslim Board of Uzbekistan (MBU). The MBU was based on an old 
Soviet structure, the Spiritual Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakh-
stan (SADUM), founded in 1943 in a period of increased tolerance for 
religion during World War II. With independence SADUM was split into 
national bodies in all the five Central Asian Republics. The MBU is also 
responsible for the rebuilding and maintenance of mosques and sacred 
places such as the tombs and mausoleums of various Muslim saints. The 
official ideology of the MBU is Sunni Islam of the Hanafi School of Law 
(though it also encompasses a small minority of Ismaili Shiites). The MBU 
is headed by a mufti who is nominated by the Muslim Council of 
Uzbekistan (MCU), a representative body consisting of imams and elders 
from all regions of the country. The candidate must then be approved by 
the government.  
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Abstract 
Secularity appears in a variety of forms shaped by different historical develop-
pments as well as political and religious circumstances. The forms of secularity 
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may be divided into categories such as the passive and the assertive. To under-
stand the situation in present day Uzbekistan, or indeed any of the former Soviet 
republics in Central Asia, however, these categories are not completely suffi-
cient. First of all the quite recent history of the region includes a form of anti-
religiosity – the scientific atheism of the Soviet Union – which aimed not just to 
separate religion from the state, but to eradicate religion altogether and should 
therefore perhaps not be defined as secularism in the normal sense of the word. 
Secondly, present day Uzbekistan has traits that fit into both of the aforemen-
tioned categories. On the one hand Islam is celebrated as a national heritage and 
a moral guideline, and politicians are often seen in religious contexts. On the 
other hand there are laws against for example proselytizing, and thus restrictions 
on religious expressions in the public sphere. About the more fundamental 
question of the separation between state and religion, the factor of state control 
and what it means for religious authority cannot be overlooked. The situation in 
Uzbekistan appears in some ways as a one-sided entanglement rather than a se-
paration; the state controls religion but religion is not allowed to affect the laws 
or the political structures of the country.  
Résumé 
Islam et laïcité en Ouzbékistan 
La laïcité revêt des formes variées suivant les contextes historiques, politiques et 
religieux, qui peuvent être regroupées en deux grandes tendances : laïcité passive 
et laïcité active. Néanmoins ces catégories ne conviennent pas exactement pour 
rendre compte de la situation actuelle en Ouzbékistan ni dans les autres républi-
ques ex-soviétiques d’Asie centrale. Premièrement, l’histoire récente de ces pays 
comprend une forme d’anti-religiosité – l’athéisme scientifique de l’Union 
soviétique – qui visait non seulement à séparer la religion de l’État, mais aussi à 
éradiquer celle-là ; aussi ne peut-elle pas être réduite à la seule laïcité. Deuxième-
ment, l’Ouzbékistan d’aujourd’hui montre des traits qui relèvent de ces deux 
tendances. D’une part, l’islam est célébré comme un héritage national et un 
guide moral, les hommes politiques se montrent souvent dans des contextes 
religieux. D’autre part, des lois interdisent le prosélytisme et plusieurs restric-
tions limitent l’expression de la religion dans la sphère publique. Or la question 
du contrôle de la religion par l’État et de ses conséquences pour les autorités 
religieuses est fondamentale. À certains égards, la situation ouzbèke actuelle 
apparaît davantage comme une relation à sens unique que comme une sépara-
tion : l’État contrôle la religion, mais celle-ci n’est pas autorisée à interférer dans 
les lois ni dans les structures politiques du pays. 
Mots-clés : Ouzbékistan, laïcité. 
Keywords: Uzbekistan, secularity. 
